Thursday, December 15, 2011

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Younger Scholar Prize

I've been asked to post the following notice about the

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Younger Scholar Prize

THE

Sponsored by the Ammonius Foundation (http://www.ammonius.org/) and administered by the editorial board of Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, the 2012 Younger Scholar Prize annual essay competition is open to scholars who are within ten years of receiving a Ph.D. or students who are currently enrolled in a graduate program. (Independent scholars should enquire of the editor to determine eligibility.) The award is $8,000. Winning essays will appear in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, so submissions must not be under review elsewhere.

Essays should generally be no longer than 10,000 words; longer essays may be considered, but authors must seek prior approval. To be eligible for the 2012 prize, submissions must be electronically submitted by 30 January 2012 (paper submissions are no longer accepted). Refereeing will be blind; authors should omit remarks and references that might disclose their identities. Receipt of submissions will be acknowledged by e-mail. The winner is determined by a committee of members of the editorial board of Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, and will be announced in early March. At the author’s request, the board will simultaneously consider entries in the prize competition as submissions for Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, independently of the prize.

Previous winners of the Younger Scholar Prize are:

Thomas Hofweber, “Inexpressible Properties and Propositions”, Vol. 2;

Matthew McGrath, “Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence”, Vol. 3;

Cody Gilmore, “Time Travel, Coinciding Objects, and Persistence”, Vol. 3;

Stephan Leuenberger, “Ceteris Absentibus Physicalism”, Vol. 4;

Jeffrey Sanford Russell, “The Structure of Gunk: Adventures in the Ontology of Space”, Vol. 4;

Bradford Skow, “Extrinsic Temporal Metrics”, Vol. 5;

Jason Turner, “Ontological Nihilism”, Vol. 6;

Rachael Briggs and Graeme A. Forbes, “The Real Truth About the Unreal Future”, Vol. 7;

Shamik Dasgupta, “Absolutism vs Comparativism about Quantities”, forthcoming, Vol. 8.

Enquiries should be addressed to Dean Zimmerman:

dwzimmer@rci.rutgers.edu

Monday, December 05, 2011

Parthood, CAI and grounding

I've posted a new paper: 'Parts generate the whole, but they are not identical to it'. The paper argues that the view that wholes are grounded (at least in part) by their parts is better than the view that wholes are their parts (composition as identity), because it does as well or better at solving certain puzzles concerning parthood, and has the advantage of not having counter-intuitive essentialist consequences. Any comments welcome!

Tuesday, October 04, 2011

Three jobs at Leeds

We are advertising three continuing lecturer jobs at Leeds, in philosophy of language, epistemology, and value.

(These jobs are roughly equivalent to tenured assistants professorships, in US terms. And feel free to apply for more than one: if you do language and epistemology, e.g., then put in two separate applications, one for each job.)

Further details:

1. Lecturer in Value Philosophy Job reference: ARTHM0010

The School seeks to hire a Lecturer in of Philosophy of Value, broadly construed to include (e.g.) normative ethics, metaethics, and political philosophy.

The position will incorporate undergraduate and postgraduate teaching, some thesis supervision, and some non-teaching administrative duties. With a research record and teaching experience commensurate with career stage, the successful candidate should have completed or submitted a PhD by the beginning of the appointment.

The successful candidate will have the ability to make an outstanding contribution to the research activities of the Centre for Ethics and Metaethics, to the research life of the department in general, and to Philosophy’s REF 2014 submission.

Post must commence no later than 1 September 2012 (or sooner if required to do so in discussion with the School).

Candidates are encouraged to apply for more than one Philosophy position where appropriate.

We particularly welcome applications from candidates belonging to groups that have been traditionally underrepresented in philosophy, including but not limited to women and ethnic minorities.

For more information on Philosophy at the University of Leeds see http://www.leeds.ac.uk/arts/info/20048/philosophy

University Grade 7 (£32,751 – £35,788) or University Grade 8 (£36,862 - £44,016)

Informal enquiries may be made to Professor Graeme Gooday Tel +44 (0)113 343 3274, messages Tel +44 (0)113 343 3260,

Email: g.j.n.gooday@leeds.ac.uk

Closing date 18 November 2011

Interviews are expected to be held in February 2012

2. Lecturer in Epistemology Job Reference: ARTHM0009

The School seeks to hire a Lecturer in Epistemology, broadly construed to include (e.g.) specialists in the history of the subject and candidates whose research engages with issues in philosophy of science.

The position will incorporate undergraduate and postgraduate teaching, some thesis supervision, and some non-teaching administrative duties. With a research record and teaching experience commensurate with career stage, the successful candidate should have completed or submitted a PhD by the beginning of the appointment.

The successful candidate will have the ability to make an outstanding contribution to the research life of the department, and to Philosophy’s REF 2014 submission.

Post must commence no later than 1 September 2012 (or sooner if required to do so in discussion with the School).

Candidates are encouraged to apply for more than one Philosophy position where appropriate.

We particularly welcome applications from candidates belonging to groups that have been traditionally underrepresented in philosophy, including but not limited to women and ethnic minorities.

For more information on Philosophy at the University of Leeds see http://www.leeds.ac.uk/arts/info/20048/philosophy

University Grade 7 (£32,751 – £35,788) or University Grade 8 (£36,862 - £44,016)

Informal enquiries may be made to Professor Graeme Gooday Tel +44 (0)113 343 3274, messages Tel +44 (0)113 343 3260,

Email: g.j.n.gooday@leeds.ac.uk

Closing date 18 November 2011

Interviews are expected to be held in February 2012


3. Lecturer in Philosophy of Language Job Reference: ARTHM0011

The School seeks to hire a Lecturer in the Philosophy of Language, broadly construed to include (e.g.) specialists in the history of the subject.

The position will incorporate undergraduate and postgraduate teaching, some thesis supervision, and some non-teaching administrative duties. With a research record and teaching experience commensurate with career stage, the successful candidate should have completed or submitted a PhD by the beginning of the appointment.

The successful candidate will have the ability to make an outstanding contribution to the research life of the department, and to Philosophy’s REF 2014 submission.

Post must commence no later than 1 September 2012 (or sooner if required to do so in discussion with the School).

Candidates are encouraged to apply for more than one Philosophy position where appropriate.

We particularly welcome applications from candidates belonging to groups that have been traditionally underrepresented in philosophy, including but not limited to women and ethnic minorities.

For more information on Philosophy at the University of Leeds see http://www.leeds.ac.uk/arts/info/20048/philosophy

University Grade 7 (£32,751 – £35,788) or University Grade 8 (£36,862 - £44,016)

Informal enquiries may be made to Professor Graeme Gooday Tel +44 (0)113 343 3274, messages Tel +44 (0)113 343 3260

Email: g.j.n.gooday@leeds.ac.uk

Closing date 18 November 2011

Interviews are expected to be held in February 2012

Tuesday, July 19, 2011

Indeterminacy workshop

The 2nd workshop for the Leeds Metaphysical Indeterminacy Project will be held on September 8-9 2011 at the University of Leeds.

Speakers and titles include:

* Katherine Hawley (St Andrews) 'A Problem of the Many for Universals' (joint work with Alexander Bird)
* Benj Hellie (Toronto) 'Treating the future as open'
* Nick JJ Smith (Sydney) 'Many kinds of indeterminacy; one kind of credence'
* Jessica Wilson (Toronto) 'Indeterminacy in the World'

The workshop will start around midday on Thursday, and finish mid-afternoon Friday. Thanks to funding from the AHRC, there is no registration fee; but if you'd like to attend, please contact Robert Williams (j.r.g.williams@leeds.ac.uk) so we can ensure we have enough space.

The workshop is the second of six sponsored by the AHRC as part of the 3-year Metaphysical Indeterminacy project at Leeds. Further details can be found at the project homepage.

Tuesday, June 14, 2011

Open future (again)

Elizabeth and I have posted a draft of a new paper on the open future: available here. Comments welcome!

Thursday, April 21, 2011

Fictional Realism, Nominalism, and Indeterminate Identity

I’ve posted a new paper: How to be a nominalist and a fictional realist. Here are the Cliff notes.

In my musical works paper, I argued that there are true claims proclaiming the existence of, and properties of, musical works, but that there weren’t really any musical works, because such claims were made true by an ontology that didn’t admit such things. In this paper, I attempt to tell a similar story for fictional characters. It’s literally true that the fictional character Bilbo Baggins exists, and it’s literally that he is a Hobbit according to the fiction The Lords of the Rings. But these claims can be made true without admitting fictional characters, or fictions, into our ontology. What makes them true, I suggest, are our acts of interpreting the fiction. Thus we can account for these truths with a nominalistically acceptable ontology (assuming, as I do, that there is in general a nominalistically acceptable account of the mental).

I also argue that the resulting view solves various puzzle cases concerning fictional characters. The most salient being Anthony Everett’s argument that fictional realism leads to untenable indeterminacy in identity. Everett argues that there are fictions in which it is indeterminate whether A is identical to B. The fictional realist believes in the fictional characters A and B. Whether the fictional characters are in reality identical is determined by whether they are identical according to the fiction to which they belong. So since it’s indeterminate whether they are identical in the fiction, it’s indeterminate in reality whether the fictional characters are identical. Reductio of fictional realist, given Evans’ argument against indeterminate identity.

I attempt to solve this puzzle by locating the source of the indeterminacy to indeterminacy in what fictional character is referred to, thus avoiding conflict with Evans’ conclusion (which is, as Lewis noted, directed only at indeterminate identity de re, not at indeterminacy in identity statements). Roughly, the idea is that when the fiction attempts to make an indeterminate identity, we are forced to interpret the fiction both ways. Given the above account, this results in there being two fictions, and two sets of fictional characters associated with each fiction, and it will as a result be indeterminate which fiction and which characters we refer to. In which case, the statement of identity will be indeterminate, but there will be no indeterminacy of identity de re.

Further details in the paper, of course; comments welcome.

Wednesday, April 20, 2011

'In virtue of' and propositions

Like many metaphysicians, I think the world is structured. Some truths hold true in virtue of others; some things exist in virtue of other things; some truths are made true by things. I think that there’s only one relation here, and it is the in virtue of relation, that holds between true propositions. For A to exist in virtue of B (i.e. for A to be ontologically dependent on B) is for the proposition [A exists] to be true in virtue of the proposition [B exists]; for the proposition P to be made true by A is for P to be true in virtue of the proposition [A exists].

Sometimes I hear the objection that this assumes that propositions are themselves fundamental constituents of reality. This objection is misplaced, for the view does not assume that. I can’t really see why one would think it did, but I’ve heard it enough times that I think it’s worth spelling out why I don’t think it does. If I’m just confused, I’d like to hear why!

Suppose you have an in virtue of chain that terminates in the proposition P. All that is entailed by this is that what P says to be the case is fundamentally the case; but that P exists may well be true in virtue of something else, and so P may itself be a derivative entity, despite its content being a fundamental truth.

Here is a toy example, just to illustrate the consistency. Suppose for every proposition, p, that p exists is true in virtue of the fact that it is possible for someone to entertain the content of p. So P might be true in virtue of Q, which is itself fundamental. But the proposition [Q exists] needn’t be fundamental. On the toy proposal, [Q exists] is true in virtue of [Possibly, someone entertains the content of Q]. Of course, now I’ve invoked another proposition, call it R; so if it is to be a derivative entity I need to invoke a new instance of the in virtue of relation. [R exists] in virtue of [Possibly, someone entertains the content of R]. And now we have another new proposition, so need a new instance of the relation; and so on, and so on. We generate an infinite sequence of in virtue of relations. But this is not, I think, a vicious regress. The success of an instance of the in virtue of relation never depends on the success of the instance of the relation it ‘generates’. P obtains in virtue of Q, and that generates a new instance: [Q exists] in virtue of R. But the success of ‘P obtains in virtue of Q’ doesn’t depend on the success of ‘[Q exists] in virtue of R’, for it doesn’t matter to P’s being grounded in Q whether or not Q is fundamental. That Q is not a fundamental existent is nice, but it’s irrelevant to Q’s ability to be the relata of the in virtue of relation. So the fact that there is an infinite sequence of in virtue of instances is, I think, unworrying.

Now, I don’t particularly recommend that account of what grounds the facts concerning the existence of propositions, but it’s clearly just a placeholder for a better account. So I think taking propositions to be the relata of the in virtue of relation simply has no consequences for whether or not propositions are fundamental constituents of the world.

Monday, January 10, 2011

Indeterminacy workshop, update.

The schedule is now finalised for the first metaphysical indeterminacy workshop, and follows, with paper titles. Again, let me know if you'd like to come.

Fri, Jan 21

1.00-1.15: Arrival and Registration
1.15-2.45: Antony Eagle (Oxford), The Open Future
2.45-3.00: Break
3.00-4.30: Agustin Rayo (MIT), Metaphysical Indeterminacy and the Contours of Logical Space

Sat, Jan 22

10.00-11.30: Carrie Jenkins (Nottingham), Indeterminacy and Analyticity: Blaming Semantics and Blaming the World
11.30-1.30: Lunch
1.30-3.00: Patrick Greenough (St Andrews), Truthmaker Gluts.
3.00: Conference Closes

All talks will be in G23, Baines wing. (Enter the university via the main entrance at the top of Parkinson steps, and there will be signs from there.)