A blog on the nature of things.
Created by the Centre for Metaphysics and Mind (CMM). Leeds, UK.
Hi Ross,Nice one! I had a couple of questions, but the more basic one is this. The relation of in virtue of/grounding need not, it seems, hold only among truths: you yourself introduce it via the example of an action being wrong in virtue of some facts about consequences. But then what would be wrong with a more direct explication of truthmaker in terms of in virtue of, along the following line?(*) A truthmaker for a given truth is something in virtue of which the truth is true.
(With 'most' and 'between', sorry ;-).)
@Dan,I guess one reason to be worried about that kind of definition is that we might want to allow, e.g., that grounded things (like people, say) can ground things (like football teams). But Ross doesn't, I take it, want to say that people are truthmakers for anything. In other words, you can have a chain of things related by the IVO relation, and Ross wants to define truthmaking in such a way that it gets you down to the ultimate ungrounded things. At least, that's my immediate thought about your suggestion.
Dear Ross,I need your precious help. I think I've read into one of your papers about the truthmaker theory something like the following suggestion: *if you have states of affairs, then you don't really need to have their constituents and vice versa*. Am I right?
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