Wednesday, January 24, 2007

structure etc

An update on CMMs upcoming workshop: Structure in Metaphysics.

http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~phlrpc/StructureWorkshop.htm

Leeds' own Robbie Williams has agreed to join Julian Dodd, Katherine Hawley and Kris McDaniel as a speaker. He will be talking on 'Semantics for Nihilists' and Hawley will be talking on 'Magic and Mereology'. Watch this space for details of Dodd and McDaniel's talks.

Registration will be on the day, although please let us know in advance if you would like to join us for dinner in the evening. There will be a £15 registration fee (only £5 for students), which will include lunch and tea/coffee.

apropos of nothing:

Many truthmaker theorists think that necessary truths don't need truthmakers, or that they are trivially made true by every thing. Many truthmaker theorists also think that if p entails q, q is made true by what makes p true. I don't agree with either claim, but certainly one shouldn't hold both, given that 'actually, p' is necessary and entails p.

4 comments:

chad said...

If 'actually p' is necessary, then it doesn't entail p, since it could have been true even if p had been false (where p is contingent). Right?

Carrie Jenkins said...

Depends what notion of 'entailment' you are working with, no?

chad said...

On which notion of entailment does the allged entailment hold?

Anonymous said...

Semantic consequence relation maybe? Treating "Actually" as a logical constant, any model that makes "Actually p" true at the designated world of the model, will also make "p" true at the designated world of the model.

But -- to go back to the original point -- the truthmaker theorist might argue that she didn't mean to be using *that* notion of entailment in formulating the principle Ross mentions.

all best
R