tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post1200917034591429378..comments2024-01-20T19:11:56.655+00:00Comments on metaphysical values: Ontological Cheating and Ockham's RazorRobbie Williamshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02081389310232077607noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-72717136505141650452016-03-31T10:40:10.797+01:002016-03-31T10:40:10.797+01:00Despite the fact that the debate hasn’t progressed...Despite the fact that the debate hasn’t progressed any, I liked your writing overall. It's original and expresses only your personal attitude towards Ontological Cheating. Our <a href="http://custom-writing.services/" rel="nofollow">http://custom-writing.services/</a> can help you in creating more popular articles - simply leave us a short note!<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11326184512615564882noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-88668835916559706602009-05-02T22:34:00.000+01:002009-05-02T22:34:00.000+01:00You make a good point. Thanks.You make a good point. Thanks.David Gawthornehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17028985071894991230noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-62222936521047725182009-04-30T08:33:00.000+01:002009-04-30T08:33:00.000+01:00I guess it depends on what we mean by 'kinds'. If...I guess it depends on what we mean by 'kinds'. If there's a past, it contains things of the kind *dinosaur*, whereas if there's no past there are no things of that kind. On the other hand, if the kinds we're interested in are *sets* and *individuals* then, of course, admitting non-present entities doesn't increase the kinds of things we admit. I guess this is exactly parallel to the Melia/Divers debate as to whether Lewis' modal realism is qualitatively parsimonious. Melia says: no, it's not - Lewis is maximally unparsimonious, because he believes there are things of any possible kind. Divers says: he believes in sets and individuals, neither of which you get to disbelieve in just by being an actualist.<br /><br />I must admit, I find it hard to judge such debates without some independent grip on what 'level' we're meant to count kinds. If I believed in ontological categories, I'd have such a grip. But I don't.Ross Cameronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01900752201200020829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-35415734302585858562009-04-29T22:35:00.000+01:002009-04-29T22:35:00.000+01:00Do you think that there might also be some use in ...Do you think that there might also be some use in differentiating a strong form of the razor (against mulitplying kinds of entities) from a weak form (multiplying instances)? After all, the non-presentist could argue that the past and future did and will contain all of the same kinds of things as the present.David Gawthornehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17028985071894991230noreply@blogger.com