tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post6461351124414949222..comments2024-01-20T19:11:56.655+00:00Comments on metaphysical values: Arbitrary ReferenceRobbie Williamshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02081389310232077607noreply@blogger.comBlogger17125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-42621884825426533002016-03-31T10:36:41.252+01:002016-03-31T10:36:41.252+01:00This is a very nice sharing! You're welcome to...This is a very nice sharing! You're welcome to our <a href="http://edit-ing.services/" rel="nofollow">online editing service - edit-ing.services</a> to "absorb" proper knowledge on how to compose articles, create short stories and so on... <br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11326184512615564882noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-36834369927157974382011-05-10T03:43:26.986+01:002011-05-10T03:43:26.986+01:00I've posted an apparent counterexample to the ...I've posted an apparent counterexample to the Breckenridge-Magidor account <a href="http://sprachlogik.blogspot.com/2011/04/breckenridge-and-magidor-on-arbitrary.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>. Comments welcome.Tristan Hazehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18008340011384137776noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-7814722593373723232009-05-01T19:33:00.000+01:002009-05-01T19:33:00.000+01:00Excellent! I'm channelling my supervisor but (as ...Excellent! I'm channelling my supervisor but (as always) with an extra metaphysical flourish!<br /><br />I'm embarrassed not to remember any of this! We'll have to chat about it when you're Leeds-based once more.Ross Cameronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01900752201200020829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-72868996064451551142009-05-01T18:51:00.000+01:002009-05-01T18:51:00.000+01:00Yeah - and we even have a record of what you asked...Yeah - and we even have a record of what you asked me!<br /><br />'Ross observed that there seems to be a general problem with truthmaker arguments based on arbitrariness. What could qualify truthmakers as fully non-arbitrary, and why should why expect such constraints to hold on the truth-making relation? Andrew replied that he doesn’t want to hang too much on truthmaker theory per se, but simply use truthmaker talk to highlight a counter-intuitive feature of the view. There seems, at least to him, to be a need for a deeper (non-trivial) explanation of why truths within the theory hold'<br /><br />It was when I was talking to John H about the failure of supervenience that we came up with the many minds thing.<br /><br />Looking back at the minutes, I think that I may have missed one of Crispin's points. Williamson preserves supervenience by postulating an unknowable (non-semantic) use property. I think that Crispin was suggesting that we could make a similar move here. There is some wholly sharp non-semantic property that explains why x gets selected rather than y, but it is unknowable what it us. If you replace 'unknowable' with 'onticly indeterminate' you get something similar to your view, it looks like.Andrewnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-225922837286161392009-05-01T18:35:00.000+01:002009-05-01T18:35:00.000+01:00Awesome! Was I at it? I can't remember it, but may...Awesome! Was I at it? I can't remember it, but may have internalised it: in any case, I'll try and get hold of it.Ross Cameronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01900752201200020829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-53885796318061522102009-05-01T18:27:00.000+01:002009-05-01T18:27:00.000+01:00hey man,
I defended an arbitrary reference accoun...hey man,<br /><br />I defended an arbitrary reference account to deal with the sorites in a short paper at Arche in 05. A copy of my paper is still up I think (Google 'Andrew McGonigal Arche' - it's called 'Vagueness and Context'). Elizabeth's minutes of the discussion are up too! It's funny looking back at them. Those were the days, when we were young and free, and hadn't heard the terrible news about the many minds theory of vagueness...Andrewnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-54202499240632890492009-04-30T20:48:00.000+01:002009-04-30T20:48:00.000+01:00Andrew >>"I didn't make the rule up...Andrew >>"I didn't make the rule up!"<br /><br />Right. I meant only to suggest that the problem you pointed to seemed to me to support my point. Sorry to belabor that point, but I'm gripped by compulsion... Here's a filled-out argument corresponding roughly to your objection:<br /><br />(1) (x)(Fx v ~Fx)<br />(2) Fx v ~Fx |UI (corresponds to "let x be an arbitrary element of the domain")<br />(3) ___Fx |assumption<br />(4) ___(x)Fx |UG<br />(5) Fx -> (x)Fx |conditional proof<br />(6) ___~Fx |assumption<br />(7) ___(x)~Fx |UG<br />(8) ~Fx -> (x)~Fx |conditional proof<br />(9) (x)Fx v (x)~Fx |hypothetical syllogism (2), (5), (8)<br /><br />I'm, btw, following Hurley (whose text I teach) in having both instantial constants and instantial variables, and in those terms the "x" occurring free on line (2) is a variable (not much depends on this label, as far as I can tell). In Hurley's system lines (4) and (7) are illicit due to restrictions on UG. If you allow UG on variables that occur free in assumption lines then you can mess with scope in all kinds of undesirable ways. <br /><br />The point I'm fixated on is that the restrictions we have on reasoning with instantial constants/variables arise out of the need to (in a sense) preserve scope from the original formulas that have been instantiated; this is my clue that instantial reasoning remains quantified reasoning (as opposed to singular). We just suppress the quantifiers to make things easier notationally, but our restrictions on when we may put the quantifiers back remind us that they never really went away.jrshipleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05991272871497674850noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-53015467313390551462009-04-30T18:58:00.000+01:002009-04-30T18:58:00.000+01:00On an unrelated note - I was wondering what the on...On an unrelated note - I was wondering what the ontic indeterminacy of the most natural meaning actually adds to your theory?<br /><br />Presumably you will say things like "Either Fred is bald or he isn't, but I don't know which." Will you also go on to say "and it's indeterminate which."? I'm finding it hard to distinguish this from the plain old ontic indeterminist about vagueness who thinks that indeterminacy necessarily involves ignorance.<br /><br />Similarly, what makes it different from the epistemicist about indeterminacy? Someone who accepts the existence of indeterminacy but thinks it's indeterminate whether p just means that I have (a certain kind of) ignorance regarding p.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-10180098356319495382009-04-30T18:41:00.000+01:002009-04-30T18:41:00.000+01:00Hi Ross.
Yeah, I wasn't saying there's anything ...Hi Ross. <br /><br />Yeah, I wasn't saying there's anything technically wrong with non-classical approaches. I was just wondering why anyone should feel the need to defend themselves against a problem that only arises if you adopt some non-classical logic. (E.g. I don't feel I'm obliged to defend myself against the analogous argument against contingency, because someone thinks that snow is white entails that snow is necessarily white.)<br /><br />jrshipley<br /><br />"You said "Fa entails AxFx by the rule." This looks to me like binding a variable that occurs free in an assumption line."<br /><br />I didn't make the rule up! (It's not a variable though, best to think of 'a' as a special kind of term for doing arbitrary reference since clearly that rule isn't licensed with ordinary names.) The restriction you suggest gets you something closer to the "necessitation rule" that is being discussed.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-20971390017924947042009-04-29T18:53:00.000+01:002009-04-29T18:53:00.000+01:00Hi Jeremy,
I think only the abstract is presently ...Hi Jeremy,<br />I think only the abstract is presently available. Think of me as giving a trailer for the forthcoming attraction! I'm not totally against the hidden quantifier view, incidentally - I'm kind of unopinionated about this. But I think the Magidor/Brecekenridge view is cool - and that's gotta be a guide to truth, or metaphysics is screwed :-)<br /><br />Awesome, my word verification below is 'grawp'. Give infinite bloggers an infinite amount of time, and their word verifications will create Harry Potter!Ross Cameronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01900752201200020829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-82665629113783086372009-04-29T18:03:00.000+01:002009-04-29T18:03:00.000+01:00Thanks Ross... I could only find an abstract of th...Thanks Ross... I could only find an abstract of the paper though. Got a link?<br /><br />Andrew. You said "Fa entails AxFx by the rule." This looks to me like binding a variable that occurs free in an assumption line. That's bad for precisely the reason that we don't want to use CP to screw with scope: e.g., don't want to get "(x)Fx v (x)~Fx" from "(x)(Fx v ~Fx)" (essentially what you did). <br /><br />That's precisely the sort of thing I had in mind in my first post. I think that these sort of restrictions support the idea that instantial reasoning is just expedited quantificational reasoning (which seems to me to obviate the need to theorize about arbitrary referents), though this is something I'll read and think more about.jrshipleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05991272871497674850noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-8688636175335136732009-04-29T17:58:00.000+01:002009-04-29T17:58:00.000+01:00Hi Andrew. I'm assuming the defender of the rule ...Hi Andrew. I'm assuming the defender of the rule just won't think it can be used in a sub-proof in the manner you suggest. So, roughly, you can't conclude from the fact that if assumption A is true the rule lets you prove that p that the rule lets you prove 'if A then p'. I don't see that there would be a big problem with not allowing the rule to be used within a sub-proof like this: do you think there is?Ross Cameronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01900752201200020829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-21248307292284698282009-04-29T14:02:00.000+01:002009-04-29T14:02:00.000+01:00I was wondering whether there was ever a good reas...I was wondering whether there was ever a good reason to accept the first rule you proposed?<br /><br />Let a be an arbitrary object. Either Fa or ¬Fa. Fa entails AxFx by the rule. ¬Fa entails Ax¬Fx by the rule. So AxFx or Ax¬Fx reasoning by cases. But this is absurd (no matter what your theory of arbitrary reference is - I only used the rule and classical logic.)<br /><br />Another modification to the rule might be: if you can prove *of* the arbitrary F that it is G, then you can prove that every F is G. In your case you can prove, de dicto, that the arbitrary object, whatever it may be, is referred to by you at t. But there's no particular object that you can show to be referred to by you at t.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-80898575353046267182009-04-28T17:54:00.000+01:002009-04-28T17:54:00.000+01:00I don't mean to place too much weight on the Frege...I don't mean to place too much weight on the Frege-Geach point. In my paper, I basically assume you've got a case of reference, and am asking what's the best way of accounting for that. I don't give any argument at all in the paper in favour of the claim that there is reference. Magidor and Breckenridge do in their paper, so let me just refer you to that - I can't remember if they specifically deal with your suggestion that (if I'm understanding right) these are disguised cases of quantification.Ross Cameronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01900752201200020829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-83020199642572336442009-04-28T12:09:00.000+01:002009-04-28T12:09:00.000+01:00If reasoning with parameters (i.e., instantial con...If reasoning with parameters (i.e., instantial constants/variables; e.g., "the arbitrary n") is just a notational expedient to quantificational reasoning about then I don't see the Frege-Geach problem. And isn't it just an expedient? When I teach my students instantiation and generalization rules I teach them that they need to be able to take off the quantifiers in order to give connectives wide scope and use inference rules, but that parameters are used to keep track of what quantifiers they're allowed to put back on.<br /><br />BTW, there's some good discussion in the philosophy of mathematics literature about this topic recently. See Pettigrew's "Platonism and Aristotelianism in Mathematics", Shapiro's "Identity, Indiscernibility, and ante rem Structuralism: The Tale of i and –i" (both in the October 08 Philosophia Mathematica) , or Burgess's "Putting Structuralism in it's Place" (available on his website). I'm attracted to Pettigrew's view that mathematical reasoning involves the employment of permanent parameters.jrshipleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05991272871497674850noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-64993182538280938442009-04-28T10:10:00.000+01:002009-04-28T10:10:00.000+01:00I was thinking that in the reductio case no term i...I was thinking that in the reductio case no term is being used that lacks reference. Terms are being mentioned that lack reference, and it's the hypothesis that they do refer that is being tested - but we never disquote until we say that there are no such things: and when we say that, the truth of the claim doesn't (obviously) require reference. But in the genuine arbitrary reference cases, we're actually using the term, so reference seems to be required for truth. Is that satisfying?Ross Cameronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01900752201200020829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-8493641106069475662009-04-28T09:45:00.000+01:002009-04-28T09:45:00.000+01:00Hi Ross, a quick worry about your answer to the fi...Hi Ross, a quick worry about your answer to the first problem. You criticise the view that 'n' doesn't refer by saying that it's difficult to see how the inference could be valid in that case. But in order to make your story about supposing for reductio that ‘an arbitrary even prime greater than 2’ refers and then semantically descending, it seems that you're going to need valid inference without reference at some point. If so there might be a dialectical problem: your main objection to the no reference view is one that your own view ends up having to face too, which leaves the no reference view looking like an overall winner. Do you have any thoughts about how to avoid that kind of move?Daniel Elsteinnoreply@blogger.com