tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post5880145757841226223..comments2024-01-20T19:11:56.655+00:00Comments on metaphysical values: Quantification, Naturalness, OntologyRobbie Williamshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02081389310232077607noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-5270998673795949342010-03-01T03:56:44.411+00:002010-03-01T03:56:44.411+00:00Ross:
I would suggest you take a good look at
W...Ross:<br /><br />I would suggest you take a good look at <br /><br />Warnock, G. J. "Metaphysics in logic" by good ol' Leeds-born philosopher. He is so seldom quoted by English and Argentine philosophers (never mind Italian) that it hurts! But it's a GEM! I discovered it as repr. in a collection of "Essays in Analysis" ed. by Flew.<br /><br />It _IS_ a gem: it's all about "there is". And without much Quinean corruption about it!<br /><br />---- I would suggest we go artlessly sexist with your 'really', really. It is, as Austin would say, really, 'a trouser word', no? (His example of the 'real duck' in Sense and Sensibilia). I love 'real', though, because I love trouser words, on the whole.<br /><br />----- I have written extensively, elsewhere on the "there" in "there is". It has nothing to do with "there" and we MAY want to go _there_. There's no such thing in any other language I know! It's 'c'e' in Italian, 'es gibt' in German, 'il y a' in French, 'hay' in Spanish. Nothing to write Quine about!<br /><br />--- Anyway, if you find the Warnock paper easily enough and can comment, either here or in my blog (The Grice Club) more than welcome. <br /><br />Cheers,<br /><br />J. L. Speranza<br />jlsperanza@aol.com<br />griceclub.blogspot.com<br /><br />--- I should say that I'm working with R. B. Jones -- he is an expert on Carnap, and I'm retrievin various uses of 'palaeo-Carnapian', and it was your use of 'neo-Carnapian' that brought me here. I see you need Hirsch vs. Sider, etc. Jones is such a Carnap fanatic that he has created a CarnapCorner.blogspot for our edification, so enjoy!Luigi Speranzahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14910051355425799904noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-77437644746235477882008-07-21T12:47:00.000+01:002008-07-21T12:47:00.000+01:00Thanks for the reply Ross. Now that you put it tha...Thanks for the reply Ross. Now that you put it that way, I clearly was just assuiming a deference for physics. My mind just jumped from simples, to an atomic world view, to modern physics. With that dropped, I'll have another look over the paper.Geoffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03247222261747552716noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-45715589515019989362008-07-20T18:02:00.000+01:002008-07-20T18:02:00.000+01:00Thanks Geoff. It's certainly right that the neo-C...Thanks Geoff. It's certainly right that the neo-Carnapian isn't going to be happy with what I say: they're not going to accept that there's a unique most natural meaning for the quantifier - so yeah, they're just going to think I'm privileging a certain description of the facts, that isn't metaphysically special. I don't aim to be capturing everything the neo-Carnapian wants to say: I just want to be able to buy into enough neo-Carnapianism to say that we can be assured that Moorean truths about what there is are true - without taking this to refute apparently revisionary metaphysics.<BR/><BR/>I think you're reading into the paper a deference for physics that I don't intend. I say I favour an ontology of simple substances, but there's no commitment there that these need to be what the physicists tell us are the physical simples. I favour an ontology of simples, because I don't want mereological notions among my fundamental ideology. But the simples, as far as I'm concerned, might be things like you and I. This isn't to say we don't have parts, though: it's to say that we don't *really* have parts; so fundamentally there might not be such things as our arms and legs, but we make it true that there are such things. Now, I'm not saying that's what is the case - but it's compatible with everything I say. Certainly, I don't think we can just read fundamental ontology off of physics - whatever the relationship there is, I think it'll be a complicated one.<BR/><BR/>On Quine: I'm happy if the debate between us reduces to one about how ot go about discovering what there really is. It's really the methodological lesson about how to do ontology that I'm interested in.Ross Cameronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01900752201200020829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-24530894020185803132008-07-18T14:40:00.000+01:002008-07-18T14:40:00.000+01:00Ross - I think the paper is great. Very clearly wr...Ross - I think the paper is great. Very clearly written. I think that talk of finding naturalness and carving nature at its joints as the task of ontology does more for you than talk of 'ontologise'. I find your view much more plausible when expressed as you have done in this paper. <BR/><BR/>I do have this feeling that your acceptance of some aspects of neo-carnapianism feels a bit like you are trying to have your cake and eat it, but i'm not sure right now how to argue for it so i'll leave it to the side.<BR/><BR/> (But:Is it really possible to accept the spirit of neo-carnapainism whilst holding that there is still a deeper 'proper' ontological question about what really exists? If I understand you right, you want to say that real ontology is about working out how nature is carved at its natural joints – and that will tell us what really exists. But doesn't this mistake ontology for particle physics? Why can't the full blown neo-carnapian say that all you are doing is showing a preference for the ontological framework of fundamental particle physics.)<BR/><BR/>My bigger worry is that the particle physics world view that you favour as the most natural is not a simple or as natural as might be hoped. For example, if electrons are probability clouds, are they simples? What if the best representation of what an electron is is as a wave function. Does this mean there really are wave functions? But then these look more like mathematical objects than the kind of simples you want in your ontology. Can I say: there aren't really electrons, just wave functions?<BR/><BR/>Perhaps you say that the wave functions (or probability clouds, or what ever) are just the way that we represent the simples and, since we shouldn't mistake our representation for an ontology of that which is represented, we don't have to worry about accepting wave functions. <BR/><BR/>But then it seems like our ontology will always be of things 'we know not what' - our fundamental ontology will always be allusive. Every attempt to describe it in language or science will not tell us what really exists – so what really exists will always be some unknown ground for all our scientific claims – which sounds a bit like Locke's substratum. <BR/><BR/><BR/>Here's another thought. I think you are being a bit unfair to Quine. Surely Quine took himself to be asking 'what really is there' - and the answer 'everything' refers to everything that there really is. All the other things don't really exist. Even if we say that they do. He wasn't asking 'what does our language say there is' because then he wouldn't have bothered with all the paraphrase stuff. Perhaps you don't agree with his methods of getting to what really exists, but you can't deny that he was asking the genuine ontological question. (perhaps this isn't a substantial point against you)<BR/><BR/>Ok, I know these ramblings do not constitute fully supported arguments, so I don't expect a detailed response, but perhaps you can get the gist of what I mean.Geoffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03247222261747552716noreply@blogger.com