tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post3473685062589487180..comments2024-01-20T19:11:56.655+00:00Comments on metaphysical values: Truthmaker theorists should be priority monists.Robbie Williamshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02081389310232077607noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-77360675748252315232009-12-18T12:26:55.983+00:002009-12-18T12:26:55.983+00:00Interesting post as for me. It would be great to r...Interesting post as for me. It would be great to read more concerning this matter. Thank you for sharing this data.<br />Sexy Lady<br /><a href="http://www.baccaratgirls.com/london/london_night_life_escorts" rel="nofollow">London night life escorts</a>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-6461268518083681952007-12-11T13:05:00.000+00:002007-12-11T13:05:00.000+00:00Hi Louis,Can I point you to the paper? The detail...Hi Louis,<BR/><BR/>Can I point you to the paper? The details of the 'no nec conns' principle are dealt with there - it would be a bit much to wrtie them out again here. If you still have worries, please let me know.Ross Cameronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01900752201200020829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-73908921053983884492007-12-10T22:59:00.000+00:002007-12-10T22:59:00.000+00:00Hi Ross,If I understand you correctly, the qualifi...Hi Ross,<BR/><BR/>If I understand you correctly, the qualification you suggest is this: a is necessitated by {a,b} in virtue of {a,b} necessitating the only possible truthmaker for the existence of {a,b}, which in turn necessitates a. The latter necessitation is unmysterious for the Humean, since it arises from a transparent entailment via conjunction elimination. So you seem to have in mind the following constraint on necessitation:<BR/>If Y necessitates X, then either (i) X ontologically depends on Y, (ii) X is transparently entailed by Y (e.g. by conjunction elim), or (iii) X is necessitated by the only possible truthmaker for the existence of Y.<BR/><BR/>(The necessitation of a by {a, b} requires clauses (ii) and (iii). A necessitation relation that requires all three clauses is, e.g., the necessitation of the singleton {a} by {a, b}.)<BR/><BR/>But now why can't the Humean TM theorist claim that P is transparently necessitated (e.g. by conjunction elim) by the only possible truthmaker for the existence of TOTALITY?<BR/><BR/>- LouisLouishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12263371874275461435noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-76505994449958452582007-12-07T09:33:00.000+00:002007-12-07T09:33:00.000+00:00This comment has been removed by the author.Ross Cameronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01900752201200020829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-61563904078507135132007-12-07T09:28:00.000+00:002007-12-07T09:28:00.000+00:00Excellent question Louis, and that's going to forc...Excellent question Louis, and that's going to force me to be more explicit about some things in the paper than I am at the moment: thanks.<BR/><BR/>But I think the pluralist is still in trouble.<BR/><BR/>The existence of {a,b} is necessitated by the existence of a and b. No problem, because a and b make it true that {a,b} exists.<BR/><BR/>The existence of {a,b} also necessitates the existence of a, and of b (and, hence, of them both). Explanation? a and b are the only possible truthmaker for the fact that {a,b} exists.<BR/><BR/>So can the pluralist say something similar in the totality fact case? Call the higher-order truthmaker ‘TOTALITY’. The existence of TOTALITY necessitates the existence of each of the first-order truthmakers. Explanation for the pluralist? The analogous explanation would be that those first-order truthmakers are the only possible truthmakers for the fact that TOTALITY exists. But that can’t be right! They’re not actually truthmakers for the fact that TOTALITY exists, because they could all exist and TOTALITY fail to exist. So the pluralist can’t explain the necessary connection between TOTALITY and each of its first-order constituents in the way the set theorist can explain the necessary connections between non-unit sets and each of its members.Ross Cameronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01900752201200020829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-1261077224685964202007-12-06T21:15:00.000+00:002007-12-06T21:15:00.000+00:00Hi Ross,Let P be a run of the mill first-order fac...Hi Ross,<BR/><BR/>Let P be a run of the mill first-order fact.<BR/>You argue from:<BR/>(1)The existence of the higher-order truthmaker necessitates the existence of P<BR/>to:<BR/>(2) P is ontologicaly dependent on the higher-order truth-maker.<BR/><BR/>Here's a parody which does not involve 2-way necessitation:<BR/>(1)* the existence of the pair set {a, b} necessitates the existence of each of a (and not vice versa).<BR/>(2)* So a is ontologically dependent on (a, b}.<BR/><BR/>This argument is intuitively invalid. Here's a diagnosis: you need an implicit "solely" in your explanation of ontological dependence: B is ontologically dependent on A iff B exists *solely* in virtue of A's existence. But {a, b} does not exist solely in virtue of a's existence, so there's necessitation without ontological dependence. Thus, the restriction on A's necessitation of B will require some sort of fix in light of this qualification. I worry that, so-fixed, the truthmaker theorist can decline priority monism.<BR/><BR/>Obviously, I'm looking forward to reading the paper.<BR/><BR/>- LouisLouishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12263371874275461435noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-39327298739052416742007-12-06T13:47:00.000+00:002007-12-06T13:47:00.000+00:00That's the caveat that I didn't go into the post, ...That's the caveat that I didn't go into the post, but do in the paper. I do want to hold that both, e.g., the singleton of a necessitates a and vice-versa; but obviously while {a} is ontologically dependent on a, a is not OD on {a}. But: I think the extra necessitation can be explained because, while many truths could have been made true by different possible truthmakers, '{a} exists' can *only* be made true by a. That's why {a} necessitates a: if {a} is around, a needs to be around to make it the case that {a} is around. (And I don't think there's a big mystery as to why a is the only possile TM for '{a} exists' - I think that's really just linguistic: it's just how we use the sentence '{a} exists'. Anyway, I say a bit more about this in the paper, but that's what I want to say when the necessary connection goes both ways.Ross Cameronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01900752201200020829noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-10884967548129428962007-12-06T11:30:00.000+00:002007-12-06T11:30:00.000+00:00Your constraint means no two-way necessitation, I ...Your constraint means no two-way necessitation, I guess?Carrie Jenkinshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01023567638433203715noreply@blogger.com