tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post115505237848855812..comments2024-01-20T19:11:56.655+00:00Comments on metaphysical values: Semantics for nihilistsRobbie Williamshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/02081389310232077607noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-1155284716955714652006-08-11T09:25:00.000+01:002006-08-11T09:25:00.000+01:00(A previous version of this comment was eaten by s...(A previous version of this comment was eaten by some internet monster... maybe it'll turn up sometime!)<BR/><BR/>The idea I had in mind was the following:<BR/><BR/>(i) A name N will be identified with some object o.<BR/>(ii) A predicate P will be identified with some object o'.<BR/>(iii) The sentence N^P will be identified with the ordered pair (N,P) , i.e. (o,o').<BR/><BR/>(So concatenation of expressions is identified with being first/second members of an ordered pair). <BR/><BR/>Then (following Sider's example) you do the Lagadonian thing: e.g. you let Billy himself be the name of Billy; the property of running be the name of the property of running, etc. So you end up identifying atomic sentences with an ordered pair containing an object and a property. (That's the simplest version: it might need to be tweaked, e.g. by adding markers for syntactic category to the things identified as names/predicates.)<BR/><BR/>There's some interesting issues going on with exactly what the "property" should be here. One natural thought is for it to be a function from worlds to extensions (sets of possibilia). But you'd have to check through to see that this doesn't induce circularity in the account. I guess when we talk of the "possiblia" in the transitive closure of the Lagadonian name for a property, what we're doing is talking about whatever actual-worldly-objects play the role of possibilia in the "realistic modal model" that Sider builds the pluriverse sentence from. But this is exactly the area in which you have to keep track carefully of the construction: I'll have to check back to see what Sider says at this point.Robbie Williamshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02081389310232077607noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-30588510.post-1155152942615440782006-08-09T20:49:00.000+01:002006-08-09T20:49:00.000+01:00Hmmmm. Will have to think about that one. An initi...Hmmmm. Will have to think about that one. An initial thought: one might say that it hasn't got mereological structure, but rather (non-mereological) set-theoretical structure. Perhaps in the (Lagadonian) language which includes the pluriverse sentence, strictly "Billy" won't be a part of "Billy runs"; rather, it will be in the transitive closure of the set that is identified with "Billy runs". <BR/><BR/>(I'm not intending by this to take a stand on the metaphysics of ordinary sentences; I'm willing to let the "pluriverse sentence" be any construction that can play the theoretical role.)<BR/><BR/>It is a bit embarressing to have to lean heavily on some *other* structuring relation, which you might think to be in worse standing than part-hood. That does seem a sense in which Sider's use of the pluriverse sentence might be stabler than mine. <BR/><BR/>Of course, granted the use of set theory here, the nihilist might just try to put sets of particles arranged rabbit-wise into the extension of "rabbit", and do pw-semantics that way. So maybe you can get a dilemma going against me that way.Robbie Williamshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02081389310232077607noreply@blogger.com